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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
LESSOR'S PRIVILEGE
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Gastel Corp. v. Rand
Laboratories, Inc.' affirmed the rule, first enunciated in Bistes v.
Checker, Cab Co. ,' that the lessor of an immovable who sells the
leased premises loses the privilege he enjoys as security for unpaid
and past due rent upon the movables of his tenant located on such
premises. The court in Bistes had analyzed the problem by analogy
to the situation in which the lessor permits the tenant to take his
movables off the premises which, under article 2705 of the Civil
Code, is considered an abandonment of the privilege by the lessor.,
The court in the Bistes case had said it could see no distinction
between removing the movables from the lessor and the lessor's re-
moving himself from the movables. The Fourth Circuit, following this
reasoning, further explained that since the lessor's privilege is a form
of pledge, the sale of the premises by the lessor is equivalent to a
voluntary surrender of property by a pledgee, noting that there was
no evidence in the record that the lessor had retained any interest in
the lease after the sale.
Despite the plausible logic of these two opinions, an examina-
tion of their underlying premises tends to cast doubt upon the con-
clusions reached. In neither case was the lessee complaining that his
possession had been disturbed; indeed, in each it appears to have
been assumed that the purchaser of the property had either assumed
the obligations of the lessor under the lease or had at least recognized
its existence. A lease is not an interest in an immovable but a per-
sonal contract with the lessor. The lessor does not warrant title to the
property leased but only the peaceful possession of the lessee and in
the absence of a disturbance the lessee cannot ordinarily contest the
title of his lessor. A sale of the leased premises does not, in itself,
relieve the lessor of his obligations under a lease, including the duty
to maintain the lessee in possession.4 Accordingly, since the lessee's
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 289 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
2. 126 So. 712 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
3. "[Tlhe lessor may seize the objects subject to his privilege before the lessee
removes them from the leased premises, or within fifteen days after they have been
removed by the lessee without consent of the lessor. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2705
(emphasis added).
4. Knapp v. Guerin, 144 La. 754, 81 So. 302 (1919). See also A. YIANNOPOULOS,
PROPERTY §95 in 2 LOUIStANA CIVIL LAW TREATIS E 275 (1966) for a discussion as to the
juridical nature of the contract of lease.
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possession and consequent right to maintain his movables upon the
premises exist because of a contract with the lessor who would have
to respond in damages if such possession were disturbed and who has
never said in the first instance that he owned the premises, it is
difficult to see how a sale of the premises which neither disturbs such
possession nor relieves the lessor of his obligations can be said to be
the equivalent of the lessor's "removing himself' from anything. Why
the lessor should not continue to enjoy the privilege for the enforce-
ment of rent which is still due to him seems hard to justify. It may
be that the court was concerned about the effect of recognition of the
privilege upon the claims of the purchaser of the property for rent due
under the lease for succeeding periods. However, this problem, when
it arises, should present no greater difficulty than would any other
case where two or more debts are secured by the same mortgage,
pledge or privilege and the creditor transfers the right to receive one
of them.
MORTGAGES
In Calloway v. Taylor,5 the defendant committed a simple error
which he then compounded into a disaster. He accepted a conveyance
of property, on which he held a mortgage, in settlement of the debt
secured by the mortgage without checking the records as to his mort-
gagor's title. Unknown to the defendant, after his mortgage had been
recorded but prior to the conveyance to him, the plaintiff recorded a
judgment against the mortgagor in the mortgage records of the parish
where the property was located.
After the property was conveyed to the defendant, the plaintiff
executed upon his judgment by seizing and selling the property at a
judicial sale at which he became the purchaser. He then filed an
action against the defendant claiming the right to possession of the
property as a result of the judicial sale. The defendant filed a recon-
ventional demand asserting that by virtue of the transfer from the
mortgagor he became the owner of the property free of the judicial
mortgage. It is unclear whether he thought the transfer to him in
settlement of the debt was equivalent to a judicial execution upon the
first mortgage which extinguished the inferior judicial mortgage or
whether he thought the judicial mortgage was simply invalid as to a
subsequent transferee of the property. The court properly rejected his
contentions, holding the judicial mortgage remained effective against
the property notwithstanding its transfer to the defendant and that
under article 3741 of the Code of Civil Procedure a judgment creditor
5. 286 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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has the right to execute upon a judicial mortgage in proceedings
conducted against the judgment debtor without regard to a transfer
of title by the latter. The court also gratuitously noted that no issue
had been presented regarding the possible security rights of the de-
fendant in the property. This latter remark may have been prompted
by Pugh v. Sample,6 in which, under similar circumstances, the
Louisiana supreme court indicated that the existence of a judicial
mortgage against property transferred in settlement of a prior mort-
gage debt was such an imperfection in title as to prevent extinction
of the mortgage by confusion, or, at least, to permit its revival upon
rescission of the sale. The court in that case said:
[W]hilst one cannot be, at the same time owner and mortgagee
of the same property, if the title which, apparently conveying
perfect ownership, is supposed to destroy the mortgage by confu-
sion turns out to be no title, or an imperfect title, the mortgage
which was suspended, and apparently destroyed, upon assump-
tion of perfect ownership in the mortgagee is revived. .... I
However, it would also appear to be essential to rescind the transfer
to the mortgagee since, even though the mortgage may not be extin-
guished by confusion because of the intervening judicial mortgage,
the giving in payment of the property extinguishes the obligation
which the mortgage secures and this also would extinguish the mort-
gage.'
In the present case it may be inferred that the proceedings for
execution upon the property by the plaintiff were conducted contra-
dictorily with the judgment debtor and that the defendant had no
notice of them until after the sale. Although article 3741 of the Code
of Civil Procedure creates a statutory pact de non alienando with
respect to mortgages and does away with the hypothecary action
properly so called, article 3742 establishes an important qualification
to this rule as it relates to the enforcement of legal and judicial
mortgages. In case of a conventional mortgage, notice of the proceed-
ings is not required to be given the third possessor, and the mortgagee
can proceed directly against his mortgagor as if the property were still
owned by the mortgagor. However, article 3742 expressly provides
that in the case of legal and judicial mortgages the seizing creditor
must cause notices of the seizure to be served by the sheriff upon both
6. 123 La. 791, 49 So. 526 (1909).
7. Id. at 797, 49 So. at 528.
8. "Mortgages are extinguished ... 2. By the creditor acquiring ownership of the
thing mortgaged . .. 4. By the extinction of the debt, for which the mortgage was
given .. " LA. CIV. CODE art. 3411.
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the original debtor and the then-owner of the property. Assuming
such notice had not been given to the defendant, it would appear that
his remedy should have been to set aside the judicial sale as being
invalid for lack of such notice and to demand that the transfer to him
by the mortgagor be rescinded thus restoring him to the position of a
creditor of the mortgagor with his debt secured by a first mortgage
on the property.
ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND THE PRIVATE WORKS ACT
Some of the problems implicit in the apparently growing practice
of assigning amounts due under construction contracts as security for
loans made to the contractor were involved in Central Bank v. Build-
ers Service, Inc.' The plaintiff bank agreed to loan money to Milton
Hale, who as security for such loans assigned the bank the amounts
to become due him under a contract with the defendant, Builders
Service, Inc., the general contractor upon a construction job for which
Hale was the electrical subcontractor. The bank from time to time
loaned Hale the monies required to meet the expenses he incurred in
performance of his subcontract, but at some point declined to make
any further loans. Hale then told Builders Service he would be unable
to complete the job for lack of funds. Builders Service thereafter
made several payments directly to Hale, with the understanding that
the latter would use the funds to pay his laborers and the suppliers
of materials used in performance of his contract. After completion of
the job by Hale the bank brought suit against Builders Service claim-
ing the amounts paid to Hale had been assigned to it and accordingly
such payments were not binding upon it. The court expressly found
Builders Service had made the payments to Hale solely to protect
itself in completion of the electrical subcontract; that had it failed
to do so Hale would have defaulted and it would have cost Builders
Service a substantial premium to have the work performed by an-
other subcontractor. It also found the bank was unaware Builders
Service was making payments to Hale.
The court concluded that Builders Service could have protected
itself by making the payments due Hale directly to the bank, and it
was thus responsible for the amount lost by the bank as a result of
diverting the funds to Hale. The court relied upon Bossier Bank &
Trust Co. v. Natchitoches Development Co. '0 as authority for the
proposition that a contractor who has paid funds to suppliers of a
subcontractor who has assigned his accounts remains liable to the
9. 291 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
10. 272 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
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assignee. The court apparently did not consider relevant the fact that
the amounts paid Hale were to be applied to the payment of wages
incurred and materials used by him in the performance of the con-
tract, and that satisfaction of such claims would ordinarily be a con-
dition to Hale's right to receive the amounts due under the terms of
the contract. Nor did it consider whether the acknowledged inability
of the subcontractor to complete his contract might have relieved the
general contractor of the obligation of making payments to the bank
under the assignment. The general contractor appears to have as-
sumed that if the subcontractor had not paid his laborers or suppliers
of materials, liens would have been filed against the job which it
would have had to satisfy. Rather than forcing the sub-contractor to
default and then attempting to pick up the pieces, it followed what
would be the normal inclination of most contractors and advanced
Hale funds necessary to pay his laborers and materialmen to com-
plete the job. The court's suggestion that the defendant could have
"protected itself" by paying the amounts to the bank is certainly
doubtful if it would thereafter have had to pay the same amounts over
to the laborers or materialmen of its subcontractor. Moreover, such
action, by forcing the subcontractor to default, thus increasing the
cost of completion to the contractor and giving rise to a claim for
damages against an insolvent subcontractor, does not appear to have
been a very viable alternative.
Two cases providing an interesting contrast to Central Bank and
further illustrating what appears to be a general uncertainty among
the courts as to the nature of the relationships among the contractor,
his subcontractors and the laborers and suppliers of materials of the
latter are Harris Paint Co. v. Quinn Construction Co." and Cox v.
W W. Heroman & Co." In the Cox case the defendant, a general
contractor, paid the claims of certain of the suppliers of materials to
Cox, a subcontractor and then claimed credit for the payments
against the amounts due Cox under his contract. A dispute existed
between Cox and his materialmen as to the amount owed them and
he had been refusing to pay, apparently hoping to effect a settlement
of their claims. Needless to say, the defendant's action in paying the
money directly to the materialmen did not meet with Cox's approval.
Cox resisted the credit claimed by the defendant by arguing that the
payment was not authorized by his subcontract, that the contractor
was not subrogated to the claims of the materialmen and accordingly
could not assert a right to recover such amounts by way of credit. In
11. 282 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
12. 282 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), afJ'd, 298 So. 2d 848 (La. 1974).
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this regard he relied upon Civil Code article 1924 which provides that
although a stranger may pay the debt of a third person he will not
be subrogated to the creditor's rights against the debtor. The First
Circuit Court of Appeal," after finding that the amounts paid the
materialmen had been clearly owed by Cox, agreed with Cox that
subrogation did not exist, but then pointed out that a right of reim-
bursement (as distinguished from subrogation) exists in favor of the
third person who pays a stranger's debt under general concepts of
unjust enrichment, relying upon the opinion of Justice Tate in
Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. "1 It thus allowed the credit to the contractor.
The Louisiana supreme court granted writs in the case and held
that the right of indemnity allowed the defendant by the court of
appeal exists only where the payment made by the third person com-
pletely extinguishes the debt and that if a conventional or legal sub-
rogation is present the debt is technically not extinguished but is
transferred to the party subrogated. It then determined that the cor-
respondence between the defendant and the materialmen showed an
intention to conventionally subrogate the former to the latter's rights
when the payments were made. However, no specific agreement to
subrogate was shown to have been present at the time payment was
actually made and much of the court's opinion is occupied with
resolving the question of whether subrogation actually occurred and
whether one could be subrogated to part of a claim against another.
It finally determined a conventional subrogation did exist and per-
mitted the credit claimed.
Justice Dixon, dissenting from the decision, pointed out that
since the contractor is obligated to pay the materialmen if the sub-
contractor does not, a legal subrogation under article 2163(3) of the
Civil Code should exist. He then, however, qualified his opinion by
noting "there is something fundamentally wrong in allowing a debtor
to pay another person instead of his creditor over the strong protest
of the creditor," and would have refused the credit.
In the Harris case the court of appeal held that under the provi-
sions of the Private Works Act, 5 a supplier of materials to a subcon-
tractor has a direct cause of action against the general contractor for
the amount due him by the subcontractor, even though he has not
filed a lien, if he gives written notice of his claim to the general
contractor within thirty days of the date a notice of acceptance of the
13. 282 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
14. 97 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
15. LA. R.S. 9:4801-17 (1950), as amended.
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job is filed in the records. This case is clearly in accord with the
statute."
If the Harris decision is correct, as the author believes, then it is
difficult to see why Justice Dixon was not correct in his view that a
contractor who pays the laborers and materialmen of his subcontrac-
tor would be legally subrogated to the claims of such parties against
the subcontractor. However, it is also suggested that the entire ap-
proach to the problem taken by the courts in both the Cox and
Central Bank cases, as well as the Bossier Bank case decided earlier,
misses the question at issue.
A contractor (or subcontractor) who undertakes the performance
of a job must certainly be held to impliedly warrant not only that he
will perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner but that
he will do so without additional cost or expense to the person with
whom he contracts. Who would contend that the owner who pays his
contractor in full and is thereafter required to again pay the material-
men or laborers who supplied the materials or performed the work
would not have an action against the contractor for a breach of his
contract? Can it not be said that an owner, faced with the raucous
cries of unpaid materialmen threatening suit and a contractor who
says he can or will do nothing about it, is any less entitled to take
action to repair the situation than is the owner whose building con-
tains a noisy and defectively constructed air-conditioner blowing only
hot air and a contractor who admits he will not or cannot make it
work properly?
By the same token can it be contended that a contractor can be
held to the full contract price by either a subcontractor or his assignee
if the subcontractor has failed to construct a component part of the
work he has undertaken or admits he cannot or will not do so to the
contractor who must then construct the thing himself to fulfill the
contract he has made with the owner? If the subcontractor constructs
16. "Before any person having a direct contractual relationship with a subcontrac-
tor but no contractual relationship with the contractor shall have a right of action
against the contractor. . . he must record his claim. . . or give written notice to said
contractor within 30 days from the recordation of the notice of acceptance by the owner
of the work. . . ." LA. R.S. 9:4814(C) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 111
§3. See also Arrow Const. Co. v. American Employer Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 582 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1973); Apex Sales Co. v. Abraham, 201 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
Although the statute implies that the giving of notice or filing of a claim is a prerequis-
ite to the "right of action" of the subcontractor (§ 4814), the act as a whole clearly
indicates that filing a claim or giving of the notice merely serves the purpose of perpet-
uating a liability created by the statute and there seems to be no reason why the
contractor, if he chose to do so, could not acknowledge the claim and waive written
notice of it.
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the component but fails to pay for it under circumstances where the
law will impose the obligation of payment upon the contractor, where
is the difference? If the subcontractor or his assignee sues for the
contract price, the contractor's defense to the claim is not by way of
subrogation or compensation - it is for reduction of the contract
price based upon the premise that having failed to perform what he
contracted to do, the subcontractor can only recover what is due him
in excess of the damages or loss caused by his failure. To express it
somewhat differently, the subcontractor's right is only to recover
what is due him to the extent he has performed his contract." The
approach of the courts in Cox, Central Bank and Bossier Bank of
treating the plea by the contractor (or owner) that he does not owe
the full contract price because of the subcontractor's (or contractor's)
default as if he were attempting to claim compensation of the con-
tract price because the debtor is indebted to him on a different obli-
gation only creates confusion and will continue to lead to inequitable
and unsatisfactory results.'"
17. A contractor may recover the value of the work which has inured to the benefit
of the owner although the work is defective or unfinished, if a price has been agreed
upon and the remedy of the owner is a reduction in price to an amount necessary to
perfect or complete the work according to the contract. Brandin Slate Co. v. Bannister,
30 So. 2d 877 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947).
18. Furthermore, to exalt the position of assignee of the subcontractor to a posi-
tion superior to that of its assignor as was done in the Central Bank and Bossier Bank
cases is clearly erroneous. The precise issue presented in those cases was long ago
rejected for reasons substantially similar to those advanced here in Pullis Bros. Iron
Co. v. Parish of Natchitoches, 51 La. Ann. 1377, 26 So. 402 (1899), involving a claim
by an assignee of a contractor to funds in the hands of the owner as against the claims
of materialmen of the contractor under LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2772-77, which are the
predecessors of the Private Works Act. Although the pattern of the latter differs sub-
stantially from that set forth in the Code and has impliedly repealed them, the princi-
ples involved, particularly as they relate to the position of the assignee of the contrac-
tor, are still valid.
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